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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MS, MEZENEN'S
CLAIM FOR UNDISTRIBUTED PRE-DECREE PROFITS OF
THE BUSINESS: THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO BASIS
FOR SUCH AN AWARD.
Ms, Mezenen has attacked the trial court's determination
regarding pre-decree profits of Kelly's Excavating, LLC despite the
court's uncontroverted determination that Ms. Mezenen had no
involvement
separation.

with

the

business

subsequent

to

the

parties'

In fact, Mr. Mezenen continued management of the

business during the separation pursuant to court order.

In light

of these undisputed findings, Ms. Mezenen's arguments regarding the
trial court's findings of pre-decree profits are unavailing.
The trial court denied Ms. Mezenen's claim for undistributed
net profits from Kelly's Excavating, LLC.
7) .

(Decree of Divorce, f

That determination was based upon the court's finding that

"since the parties' separation in the fall of 1994, Plaintiff has
had virtually no contact with Kelly's Excavating, LLC and that her
duties and responsibilities were assumed and discharged during that
period by the Defendant based upon Court order . . . ." (Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 9).
Ms. Mezenen attempts to controvert this express finding by
claiming that she "offered" to continue her employment at Kelly's

1

Excavating, LLC.

That assertion is insufficient to sustain her

argument, particularly in light of the court's previous order that
Mr. Mezenen continue management of the business, which was not only
logical but premised on the fact that Ms. Mezenen had never been
heavily involved in management of the business1.
However, and more importantly, the court found that there was
no

cash

available

to

effectuate

the

undistributed profits of the business.

distribution

of

±he

Specifically, ±he xsourt

found that all undistributed profits of the business accumulated
between the date of the parties' separation in September 1994 to
the date of the Decree were either (1) accounted for in draws
received by Mr. Mezenen as salary; (2) paid to Ms. Mezenen as
temporary alimony; or (3) any available cash was included in the
calculation of the net worth of the business.

(Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, f 23).
Ms. Mezenen has advanced no concrete facts in support of her
argument that such "phantom" profits should have been distributed.
Rather, she asserts merely that defendant's imputed salaries in the
amount of $72,000.00

for 1994 and $75,000.00

1

for 1995 were

In fact, the court found that the $2,000.00 per month
salary received by Ms. Mezenen before the parties' separation was
a mere of income shift frcm Mr. Mezenen in order for Ms. Mezenen to
claim her children as exemptions and deductions for income tax
purposes. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, J 13).
2

excessive,

and

that

there

was

a

sufficient

sum

in

accounts

receivable and cash to support a claim for undistributed profits.
As more fully discussed below, the imputed salary amounts were
fully supported by the record.

Furthermore, as explained in the

court's findings, such available cash was included in the business
net worth calculations.

Since Ms. Mezenen was awarded one-half the

value of the business, she received her portion of those funds,
simply in a different form.

Consequently, there is no basis or

funds for any pre-decree distribution of profits, and the trial
court's finding in this regard should be upheld.
II.
TBI TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED MR.
MEZENEN'S IMPUTED SALARY BASED UPON THE EXTENT
AND NATURE OF HIS WORK: FURTHERMORE. THE
COURT'S VALUATION OF THE BUSINESS IS FULLY
SUPPORTED.
Despite the fact that she received one-half of the value of
the business, Ms. Mezenen challenges the trial court's marital
estate division based upon its valuation of the business and the
salary imputed to Mr. Mezenen.
Ms. Mezenen cites extensive, although misapplied, authority in
support of the proposition that a business considered to be a
martial asset is subject to equitable distribution principles. Her
reliance upon such authority is clearly misplaced; Ms. Mezenen in
fact received one-half the value of the business, as determined by
3

the court2.
herself

(Decree of Divorce, f 14). In fact, as Ms. Mezenen

acknowledges,

the

heart

of

her

dispute

regarding

distribution of the business involves its valuation; specifically,
the difference

in valuation of the business based upon Mr.

Mezenen's imputed salary.

(See Appellee's Brief, at p. 32).

Ms. Mezenen sets forth absolutely no specific facts which
could conceivably support h8*r^ attack on the imputed salary of
$72,000.00 and $75,000.00 for 1994 and 1995, respectively, and did
not do so at trial. In light of the court's detailed findings, her
claim is insufficient.

The court specifically found that Mr.

Mezenen was responsible for virtually all aspects of the business;
negotiating contracts, financing arrangements, securing customers
as well as performing the construction work.

In fact, the court

found that "the business is dependent upon the Defendant and his
construction skills and expertise for its successful operations."
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 21). The court also
found that Mr. Mezenen4 worked 12 to 14 hours per day, often seven
days a week.
The court's Finding is undoubtedly based on the testimony of
Mr. Mezenen's accounting expert, Merrill Norman.

2

Mr. Norman

The cash payment ordered by the court to equalize the
property division is exactly the type which was affirmed in the
case cited by Ms. Mezenen, Weston v. Westonr 773 P.2d 408 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
4

testified that his estimation of a reasonable, market based salary
for Mr. Mezenen was based upon (1) his interviews with Mr. Mezenen;
(2) a job offer that Mr. Mezenen had in November, 1995; and (3)
other reported salaries for heavy equipment operators as set forth
in the Utah Heavy and Highwaymaster Agreement (R. at 683-683; 688691). Furthermore, Ms. Mezenen's unsubstantiated attempt to attack
the number of hours of work that the court attributed to Mr.
Mezenen is equally unavailing.

Mr. Norman testified that his

salary figure was based upon a ten to twelve hour work day, 6 %
days per week, which he then reduced by 15% as an element of
conservatism.

(R. at 719).

Significantly, Mr. Mezenen was not

merely an employee of the business; he performed a great deal of
the equipment operation, as well as managing all affairs and
aspects of the business.
Ms. Mezenen has utterly failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the court's Finding, as she is required to do, and then
set forth facts sufficient to controvert these Findings. In truth,
she does not even attempt to controvert them and on the merits and
the evidence can not do so.

Instead, she relies solely upon

generalized allegations of fraud. Ms. Mezenen cites the testimony
of Donna Chatwin, who claimed that Mr. Mezenen was in fact
concealing assets from the court.

However, Ms. Mezenen fails to

show how such alleged concealment of assets impacts the valuation
5

of the business and the salary imputed to Ms. Mezenen.

She appears

to be arguing that Mr. Mezenen should somehow be punished by
increasing the value of the business, and, consequently, the amount
of the distribution to her.

Because Ms. Mezenen has failed to

point to any evidence in the record sufficient to controvert the
court's findings regarding valuation, the distribution as ordered
by the court should be upheld and sustained^
III.
THE CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT AND FUNDS USED TO
MAKE A DOWN PAYMENT ON THE PARTIES' RESIDENCE
WERE PRE-MARITAL ASSETS WHICH THE COURT
PROPERLY CREDITED TO MR, MEZENEN.
Ms. Mezenen objects to the court's award of certain assets to
Mr.

Mezenen;

specifically,

a

Certificate

of

Deposit

in

the

approximate amount of $13,000.00, and a $5,800.00 cash down payment
on the parties' residence.

These assets were properly determined

to be the pre-marital property of Mr. Mezenen and, consequently,
not subject to equitable distribution.

Ms. Mezenen has asserted

absolutely no facts whatsoever sufficient to overcome this wellestablished rule.
The court specifically found that the Certificate of Deposit
and down payment on the parties' residence were the pre-marital
assets of Mr. Mezenen.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

f's 7, 8 ) . This finding is more than adequately supported by the
6

evidence in the record.

Specifically, (1) the house on which Mr.

Mezenen made the down payment was purchased before the marriage;
(2) Ms. Mezenen was unemployed and receiving public assistance and
housing

benefits

when

the

parties

began

their

relationship

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f s 3, 4); and (3) the
Certificate of Deposit was an inheritance received by Mr. Mezenen
prior to the parties marriage (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, f 7).
Consequently, Mr. Mezenen was properly awarded these assets.
As this Court, along with the Utah Supreme Court, has repeatedly
held, "premarital property is considered separate property and will
be retained by the party who brought it into the marriage."
Rappleye v. Rapplaye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Ms.
Mezenen has failed to demonstrate any evidence in the record which
would tend to overcome this presumption.

Consequently, the trial

court's ruling should be upheld.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S EQUITABLE ALLOCATION OF
BUSINESS ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, INCLUDING
THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MARITAL BUSINESS,
SHOULD BE UPHELD.
In

her

Brief,

Ms.

Mezenen

has

advanced

a

frankly

unintelligible argument regarding allocation of tax liabilities.
This appears to be the same argument which was raised by Ms.

7

Mezenen's counsel at trial and rejected in its entirety by the
trial court.

Ms. Mezenen is apparently attempting to argue that

Mr. Mezenen7s imputed income of $72,000.00 for 1994 and $75f000.00
for 1995, combined with the court's equitable allocation of the
business7 assets and liabilities, including those associated with
taxes, has resulted in some prejudice to her,

In fact, the

approach espoused by Ms. Mezenen is not only unsupported, it is
essentially a request that the court enter an order beyond its
jurisdiction.
Ms. Mezenen7s argument is apparently based on a misunderstanding of the effect of the imputation of a salary to Mr. Mezenen
for purposes of valuing the business.

The imputation of a salary

to Mr. Mezenen most certainly did not represent funds being
received by Mr. Mezenen, nor did the business ever have the cash
available to make these distributions.
In fact, as recognized by the trial court, Mr. Mezenen was
receiving a $2,000.00 per month salary prior to the parties7
separation, which was transferred to Ms. Mezenen in early 1994 to
allow her to sufficient earnings to claim her two children from a
previous marriage as tax deductions.
Conclusions of Law, f 13).

(Findings of Fact and

During this period, Mr. Mezenen

received absolutely no compensation for his full-time management of
8

the company.

This arrangement continued despite the fact that Mr.

Mezenen worked exceptionally long hours, often seven days a week,
in

his

active

operations.

management

of

every

aspect

of

the

business'

Ms. Mezenen, on the other hand, had only limited

involvement with the company even prior to the separation.
Furthermore,

by

adopting

the

business

valuation

of Mr.

Mezenen's expert, Merrill Norman, the trial court rendered an
equitable allocation of all of the business assets and liabilities,
including tax benefits and detriments.

In essence, Ms. Mezenen is

asking the court to issue orders regarding the substance of federal
income tax returns, something which it has no jurisdiction to do.
For Ms. Mezenen to argue that Mr. Mezenen should bear the burden of
a tax liability based upon an income which he never received, when
the court executed an equitable allocation of all aspects of the
business, is patently unjust.

The trial court's order regarding

equitable distribution of the business and allocation of concurrent
assets and liabilities should be upheld.
V.
TUB TRIAL COURT MADE ABSOLUTELY NO FINDINGS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO MS. MEZENEN: FURTHERMORE, AN AWARD OF
FEES ON APPEAL IS UNWARRANTED.
The trial court granted Ms. Mezenen an award of attorney's
fees without making any findings regarding the reasonableness of

9

such fees, her need, or Mr. Mezenen's ability to pay, all of which
are required by Utah law. Ms. Mezenen's attempt to support the fee
award by reference to Mr. Mezenen's alleged concealing of assets is
of no help; there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Mezenen
asserted a claim or defense in "bad faith" as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56, the section asserted by Ms. Mezenen.
The trial court's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law are
devoid of any reference to Ms. Mezenen's need, Mr. Mezenen's
ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the requested fees3.

All

of these factors are undisputably required to be considered by the
trial court under Utah law. Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

Ms. Mezenen tries to circumvent this glaring

absence of support in the record by claiming that she has "limited
income" and that Mr. Mezenen was awarded a "valuable business."
Such evidence is not part of the court's Findings, and may not be
considered in determining the propriety of the award.

3

It is telling that Ms. Mezenen makes absolutely no
reference to the fact that she was allowed to amend her complaint,
mid-trial, to assert a claim for attorney's fees. Such amendment
was improper under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and created significant prejudice for Mr. Mezenen, most importantly
because he was afforded no opportunity to investigate the
reasonableness of the claimed fees. The trial court's award of
fees should be reversed on this ground alone. Staker v. Huntington
Cleveland Irrigation Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983).
10

Furthermore, Ms. Mezenen's attempt to rely upon Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 is equally unavailing.

That section allows an award of

attorney's fees if an action or defense is without merit and
brought in bad faith.

There is no such showing here.

Assuming,

arguendo, that the trial court properly allowed mid-trial amendment
of the complaint, there is no showing, nor is there such a finding
in the court's Findings of Fact, that Mr. Mezenen raised any claim
or defense in bad faith4. Consequently, the trial court's award of
fees should be reversed.
Nor is there any basis for an award of fees on appeal. Ms.
Mezenen merely asserts conclusorily that she should be awarded fees
on appeal because of Mr. Mezenen's imputed salary of $72,000.00,
and because she has "insufficient funds." Again, since the trial
court

made

no

finding

regarding

Ms. Mezenen's

allegations may not properly be considered.

need5,

such

Furthermore, Ms.

4

Ms. Mezenen cites Finlayson v. Finlaysonr 874 P. 2d 843
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) in support of her claim for attorney's fees.
However, Finlaysonr and the authority cited therein, deals with the
specific situation where one party is forced to bring proceedings
to compel due to the other party's failure to comply with the
provisions of a decree or order. Here, no such proceedings have
ever been brought. Consequently, these cases are inapposite.
5

To the contrary, the trial court found that, at the time of
the divorce, Ms. Mezenen was engaged in a training program which
would enable her to "provide for her own support and maintenance"
and that she expected to receive "a fairly significant pay increase
at her new job and position." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law 5 15).
11

Mezenen must show that she "prevailed on the main issues" in order
to receive an award of fees on appeal. Rosendahl v. Rosendahlf 876
P.2d 870, 875 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Based upon the issues raised

in the appeal and cross-appeal, there is no basis for such a
showing. Consequently, the trial court's decision (1) to allow Ms.
Mezenen to amend her complaint mid-trial and (2) to enter an award
of fees without any of the requisite findings should be reversed,
and the parties ordered to bear their own costs and fees on appeal.
VI.
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATES THAT MS. MEZENEN ENGAGED IN
COHABITATION; IH1 EVIDENCE; IN THE RECORD
SPECIFICALLY CONTRADICTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION.
Not surprisingly, Ms. Mezenen fails to point to any evidence
in the record sufficient to support the trial court's plainly
erroneous finding that she did not engage in cohabitation.

This

finding is undeniably against the weight of the evidence and in
contradiction to well-established Utah law. Ms. Mezenen's attempt
to support the finding by claiming that the temporary alimony
payments in fact represented a partial distribution of profits is
baseless and lends no support whatsoever to the trial court's
erroneous finding.
In her Brief, Ms. Mezenen relies upon the fact that the
cohabitant, Mr. Grumwald, was working out of state while engaging
12

in a relationship with Ms. Mezenen.
this fact is, frankly, irrelevant.

Under prevailing Utah law,
The record demonstrates the

following:
•

Mr. Grumwald stayed in Ms. Mezenen's home for overnight

periods during 1995 when he was working in the state of Utah (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 116) ;
•

the two traveled together outside the State of Utah on

numerous trips financed by Mr. Mezenen, went on camping trips
within the state, and engaged in sexual intercourse (Exhibit A, f
19; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 118-119, 125);
•

while residing with Ms. Mezenen, Mr. Grumwald performed

various household tasks, including purchasing groceries, assisting
with

cooking

and household

chores, and helping Ms. Mezenen's

children with their homework (Exhibit A, f 19, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 123124, 126-127); and
• he used the utilities at will, and had free access to Ms.
Mezenen's residence, where he stored snowmobiles and other vehicles
(Exhibit A, fl 19).
In light of this express, uncontroverted

testimony which

became part of the trial court's Findings, the conclusion that Ms.
Mezenen did not engage in cohabitation is plainly erroneous and an
abuse of discretion.

The facts presented are virtually identical

to those in Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App.
13

1996) (a finding of cohabitation was warranted where the alleged
cohabitant stayed with Ms. Pendleton in her home "ninety percent of
the time" while he was in town, despite the fact that his job
required substantial travel out of state, he came and went at will,
and ate almost all of his meals with Ms. Pendleton while he was in
town), and mandate the same result; i.e., a finding of cohabitation
requiring a refund of alimony previously paid under the temporary
orders.
Furthermore, Ms. Mezenen's attempt to argue that the alimony
previously paid was in fact not alimony, but a distribution of
profits, is both unsupported and unavailing.

The trial court

expressly noted that "the Defendant was ordered to pay to the
Plaintiff as and for alimony on a temporary basis the sum of
$1,200.00 per month . . . ."
Law, f 16).

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Ms. Mezenen attempts to rely upon another portion of

the Findings; specifically, that there were no undistributed
profits of the business to be awarded.

However, the court was

merely explaining what had happened to such profits. The fact that
certain alimony payments were made by the business, which was
awarded

to

Mr.

Mezenen,

has

no

bearing

whatsoever

on the

cohabitation issue.

Mr. Mezenen was ordered to pay temporary

alimony.

Ms. Mezenen engaged in cohabitation during

He did so.

14

that

period.

As

such

the

trial

court's

decision

regarding

cohabitation should be reversed.
VII.
THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE COURT CORRECTLY
DECLINED TO ADMIT LACKED FOUNDATION AND
RELEVANCE.
Ms. Mezenen asserts that a 1995 Partnership tax return which
was never filed with the Internal Revenue Service should have been
admitted into evidence.

Not only did the document lack foundation;

Ms. Mezenen has failed to allege or demonstrate that she was
prejudiced by the court's refusal to admit the document.

Absent

such impact on the substantial right of a party, the court's
decision

to

admit

or

refuse

to

admit

evidence

will

not

be

overturned.
It is undisputed that the tax return was never filed with the
Internal Revenue Service.

Consequently, it is not binding upon Mr.

Mezenen or the company, and does not represent any accurate measure
of profits or value.
show that
substantial

the

More importantly, Ms. Mezenen has failed to

non-admission

right

which

fundamental prerequisite.

she

of the tax returns
possessed.

This

impacted
showing

any

is

a

As this Court explained in Hardy v.

Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), "[w]e will not reverse a
trial court's determination on the admissibility of evidence absent
an abuse of discretion impacting a party's substantial rights."
15

Id, at 924. See State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) ("in reviewing a trial
court's decision to admit evidence, we will not reverse that ruling
unless a substantial right of the party has been affected") .
Because Ms. Mezenen has failed to make any showing of
prejudice or substantial impact upon her rights, the trial court's
decision not to receive into evidence the 1995 tax return should be
upheld.
CONCLUSION
Essentially, Ms. Mezenen has attacked key elements of the
trial court's property distribution while failing to make any
showing as to why it should be disturbed.

Ms. Mezenen claims that

the trial court erred by not making a distribution of pre-decree
profits of the parties' business, but fails to demonstrate that
there was cash available to effectuate the distribution. The trial
court expressly found that such profits were accounted for in
salary

to Mr. Mezenen and alimony payments to Ms. Mezenen.

Although

Ms. Mezenen

available cash, she

claims that the business

enjoyed

some

fails to address the fact that any such cash

was included in the valuation of the business. Ms. Mezenen, then,
enjoyed the benefit of such cash in the court's allocation of the
value of the business.

16

Ms. Mezenen7s attempt to challenge the court's finding of
imputed salary to Mr. Mezenen is equally flawed.

The record is

replete with support for such imputed salary, particularly in light
of the fact that Mr. Mezenen was responsible for virtually all
aspects of the business7 operations, as he was in fact ordered by
the court to over see. Ms. Mezenen has not only failed to marshal
all of the evidence in support of the specific finding, as she is
required to do, she has also failed to demonstrate any reason as to
why it should be reversed.
The court's findings regarding premarital assets should also
be upheld.

It is undisputed that the Certificate of Deposit and

approximately $5,800.00 in funds used to make a down payment on the
parties' residence were acquired before the marriage by Mr. Mezenen
and, consequently, were properly awarded to him as his separate and
premarital property. Ms. Mezenen has asserted no facts whatsoever
sufficient to reverse that finding.
As fully set forth in Mr. Mezenen's opening Brief, both the
trial court's award of attorney's fees to Ms. Mezenen and its
finding regarding cohabitation should be reversed. The trial court
plainly erred by allowing Ms. Mezenen to amend her complaint to add
a claim for fees mid-trial, and by awarding such fees without
making any of the findings long required by Utah law. Finally, the
trial

court's

finding

regarding
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cohabitation

was

blatantly

erroneous.

It is difficult to imagine a clearer-cut case of

cohabitation as these facts demonstrate.

In light of Ms.

Mezenen's own testimony, the trial court's finding regarding
cohabitation should be reversed.
In sum, Mr, Mezenen respectfully submits the following: (1)
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce regarding distribution of
property should be upheld; and (2) the trial court's findings
regarding attorney's fees and cohabitation should be reversed.
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